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Abstract
Intermediaries helping individuals and ￿rms with the government bu-
reaucracy are common in developing countries. Although such bureau-
cracy intermediaries are, anecdotally, linked with corruption and welfare
losses, few formal analyses exist.
In our model, a government license can bene￿t individuals. We study
individuals￿net gain when acquiring the license through the regular bu-
reaucratic procedure, through bribing or through intermediaries. For a
given procedure, individuals using intermediaries are better o⁄ than if
intermediaries and corruption had not existed. Intermediaries ￿grease
the wheels￿ . We then study incentives of corrupt bureaucrats to create
red tape. When free to choose levels of red tape, bureaucrats implement
more red tape and individuals are unambiguously worse o⁄ in a setting
with intermediaries than with "direct" corruption only.
Intermediaries can thus improve access to the bureaucracy, but also
strengthen incentives to create red tape - a potential explanation why
license procedures tend to be long in developing countries.
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11 Introduction
Intermediaries that help individuals and ￿rms with the government bureaucracy
are present throughout the developing world. Yet, there is a limited under-
standing of what such bureaucracy intermediaries do. Although the prevalence
of intermediaries is, anecdotally, linked with corruption in the government bu-
reaucracy and a welfare loss, there are few formal analyses of the topic. On the
empirical side, there is an almost complete lack of studies involving bureaucracy
intermediaries.
This paper aims at ￿lling a gap in the theoretical literature on bureaucracy
intermediaries. In a model where individuals can get a bene￿t by going through
a license procedure at the government bureaucracy, we study how individu-
als￿net gain from the license is a⁄ected when the license can also be acquired
through intermediaries. We study how the incentives of government bureaucrats
to create red tape are a⁄ected when there are intermediaries, and what e⁄ects
such "endogenous red tape" has on individuals￿gain from the license.
The study focuses on one speci￿c aspect of what intermediaries can o⁄er
individuals and ￿rms - time saving. Individuals can acquire the license through
the regular procedure, or by bribing corrupt bureaucrats to get a speedier treat-
ment, or from an intermediary, each of which is associated with di⁄erent time
costs. From individuals￿choice of how to acquire the license, we derive several
interesting and novel results.
We ￿rst show that, ceteris paribus, individuals acquiring licenses through
either corrupt bureaucrats or intermediaries are unambiguously better o⁄ than
if corruption and intermediaries had not existed. Second, and importantly, we
show that the incentives of bureaucrats to complicate bureaucratic procedures
and add red tape di⁄er in models with intermediaries. Bureaucrats ￿nd it
optimal to create more red tape when there are intermediaries. Third, we show
that, when corrupt bureaucrats can choose their ￿optimal￿level of complication
of the government bureaucracy, individuals￿net gain is lower in a model with
intermediaries than in a model with "direct" corruption only. In both cases,
individuals￿net gain from the license is, in turn, lower than in the case - without
corruption and intermediaries - where the regular license procedure is (just)
a⁄ordable to all individuals.
This paper is one of the ￿rst where the intermediary function is explic-
itly modeled. Individuals (and ￿rms) are the clients of intermediaries, clients
that demand licenses and permits from the government bureaucracy.1 The in-
termediary has the technology to acquire these licenses and permits from the
government bureaucracy, and can make a pro￿t from the intermediation. In the
1In section 2, we document evidence on the prevalence of bureaucracy intermediaries in
di⁄erent parts of the world. Both individuals and ￿rms use such intermediaries. The speci￿c
model in this paper is one of individuals￿demand for intermediaries, a demand derived from
time saving aspects. However, the model can be broadly interpreted to concern also ￿rm
demand for intermediaries.
2paper, we study the impact from di⁄erent degrees of competition between inter-
mediaries on license allocations, incentives to create red tape and individuals￿
gain from licensing.
Time costs at the bureaucracy are fundamental for the analysis in this pa-
per. The model is inspired by the fact, especially true in developing countries,
that individuals and ￿rms getting licenses typically have to spend considerable
amounts of time in completing license procedures, including visiting multiple
government o¢ ces at di⁄erent locations and at di⁄erent points in time.2
In the model presented, acquiring a license means completing a number
of steps at the government bureaucracy. Each step of the procedure involves
an interaction with a bureaucrat, is associated with a ￿nancial cost, a time
cost of queueing and, importantly, a transport time cost. Individuals di⁄er in
their value of time. Bureaucrats are corrupt, meaning that they will, against
bribe payments, let individuals skip the line at counters. Thereby, individuals
avoid queueing time costs associated with the procedure. Transport time costs
however, cannot be a⁄ected by corrupt bureaucrats. Intermediaries, on the
other hand, act as a ￿one stop shop￿ . Individuals go to the intermediary, ￿ll
in all relevant papers, pay a fee, and then get the license through no further
interaction. From the perspective of the individual, all bureaucracy-related
queueing and transport time costs are avoided.
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, it is important to distinguish
between di⁄erent types of corruption. Here, corruption means ￿speed money￿ .
An individual can bribe a corrupt bureaucrat in order to not stand in a line, or
use an intermediary (that in turn pays corrupt bureaucrats), which avoids time
costs altogether. Bureaucrats thus accept speed money both directly - which
lets individuals skip queues, and through intermediaries - which lets individuals
avoid time costs altogether. The bureaucrat does his job however, in terms
of making sure that the individual ful￿lls the necessary regulation.3 We do
not consider the case where corrupt bureaucrats and/or intermediaries allow
undeserving individuals to obtain licenses or permits.4
2de Soto (1989) reported that starting a ￿rm in Peru involved 11 di⁄erent steps at 7 di⁄erent
government authorities. The procedure to obtain legal authorization to build a house on state-
owned land involved 15 di⁄erent steps at 6 di⁄erent authorities, which in turn consisted of a
total of 207 sub-steps at approximately 50 (sub-) o¢ ces/counters/desks. As reported in de
Soto (2001), the formalization of property, or similar procedures, involved 168 steps in the
Philippines, 77 in Egypt and 111 in Haiti. Since the writings of de Soto, the Doing Business
project at the World Bank has documented procedures for starting ￿rms, registering property,
getting credit etc., in a large number of countries. For the very same procedure, the number
of government o¢ ces that has to be visited, the time delays involved and the costs tend to be
signi￿cantly higher in the developing world, compared to developed countries (World Bank,
2010).
3This is similar to what was termed ￿corruption without theft￿ by Shleifer and Vishny
(1993). If a bureaucrat sells a passport for the o¢ cial fee plus an additional fee (bribe),
reports the issuance of the passport correctly and delivers the o¢ cial fee to the government,
corruption is ￿without theft￿.
4This paper has a di⁄erent question than many recent studies of corruption and red
3In addition, we need to distinguish ￿speed money￿from ￿extortion￿ . Ex-
tortion refers to the case when bureaucrats charge for doing their job at all.
An individual has to pay an illegal fee in order to get a document that he/she
is legally entitled to. Di⁄erently, in the case of ￿speed money￿ , the option to
stand in line the regular way still exists and the individual thus has the choice to
not bribe.5 The distinction between the two gets blurred however when there is
"endogenous red tape", i.e. when corrupt bureaucrats have the choice of work-
ing slowly - thereby a⁄ecting individuals￿incentive to pay speed money, as in
Lui (1985), or a⁄ect the length/complexity of the bureaucratic procedure, as
will be the case here.
Lui (1985) sets out to formally investigate what he calls the ￿Myrdal hy-
pothesis￿ , i.e. if corrupt bureaucrats have an incentive to slow down service.
In Lui￿ s model, the bureaucrat awards a license in a one-step procedure. The
bureaucrat chooses a speed of service, i.e. how fast he works with each applica-
tion, that is neither too fast - which would leave individuals in the queue with
too much surplus even if they have a cost of waiting, nor too slow - which would
make individuals choose to not queue (and bribe) at all.
In our model, bureaucrats do not choose a speed of service but can instead
a⁄ect the length of the procedure. Many authors, e.g. Rosenn (1971), de Soto
(1989), Tanzi (1998), La Porta et al. (1999), have hypothesized that bureaucrats
deliberately create extra bureaucratic hurdles, or red tape, in order to extract
bribes and, in addition, some have argued that such proceeds are channeled
through intermediaries (Bertrand et al., 2008). As expressed by Rosenn, citing
a typical Brazilian complaint regarding civil servants and the need to go through
time consuming red tape; "Œles criam di￿culdades para vender facilidades (they
create di¢ culties in order to sell facilities)" (Rosenn, 1971, p. 535).
We let n - the number of steps in the license procedure - which is ￿rst treated
as an exogenous parameter, become a choice variable of the corrupt bureaucrats.
In actual license procedures, we often observe that a multitude of o¢ ces have
to be visited, documents should be stamped and certi￿ed, individuals have
tape. A typical question asked in the literature is how the existence of corruption ￿ which
arises from a principal/agent relationship - a⁄ects the allocation of (scarce) government ben-
e￿ts/licenses/permits, where the social bene￿t of allocating the permit to some (deserving)
individuals is higher than allocating it to other (undeserving) individuals. In such settings,
corruption means accepting bribes to let undeserving/unquali￿ed individuals obtain bene￿ts.
Banerjee et al. (2009) provide a framework for studying the e⁄ects of corruption and the
emergence of red tape in such settings. Additional references are also provided in this paper.
Bertrand et al. (2008) document that in Delhi, India, using an intermediary/agent is the way
to get a driver￿ s license without actually learning how to drive. The result from this type of
corruption is individuals with driver·s licenses but without proper driving skills. It involves a
social cost which is not present in, and not the purpose of, the analysis in this paper. Here, all
applicants are "deserving". The cost involved in the allocation of licenses is instead time costs
at the bureaucracy. We study the impact of bureaucrats￿acceptance of speed money and of
the existence of intermediaries - both of which may reduce such time costs, on individuals￿
net gain from licensing.
5This distinction, important for the model in this paper, thus di⁄erentiates ￿speed money￿
from "corruption without theft" as analyzed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) (see footnote 3).
4to visit the same bureaucrat several times as the procedure progresses, etc.
When endogenizing n, we thus have in mind corrupt bureaucrats that either
have discretion over the actual implementation of the licensing procedure, or
that lobby against legislators in order to in￿ uence n, or that channel some
corruption proceeds to supervisors that have power over the implementation of
the licensing procedure. We take the principal-agent relationship between the
government and the corrupt bureaucrats as given and focus on how bureaucrats
optimal choice of n di⁄ers between the cases with and without intermediaries.
Comparing these optimally chosen n to a benchmark model without corruption
and without intermediaries - we de￿ne as red tape any license steps in excess of
the maximum regular procedure length that is a⁄ordable to all individuals.6
We assume "centralized corruption" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). All cor-
rupt bureaucrats take one joint decision on bribe levels (and n). We ￿rst study
the incentives to create red tape when there are no intermediaries, with results
echoing those of Lui (1985). Importantly, we then proceed to study how bureau-
crats￿incentives to create red tape di⁄er when there are intermediaries.7 The
e⁄ect from such endogenous red tape, on individuals￿net gain from the license,
is also addressed.
We start with a setting where intermediaries are perfect competition ￿down-
stream￿ ￿rms, acquiring licenses from ￿upstream￿ pro￿t maximizing corrupt
bureaucrats. We explore how the degree of competition between intermediaries
a⁄ect individuals￿gains from licenses and incentives of bureaucrats to create red
tape. Inspired by anecdotal evidence from several countries that an intermedi-
ary is typically a former bureaucrat, at the end of the paper we brie￿ y speculate
on how collusion between corrupt bureaucrats and a monopolist intermediary
would a⁄ect result.
There are a few papers on bureaucracy intermediaries, somewhat related to
this paper. Hasker and Okten (2008) analyze the impact from intermediaries on
the degree of socially bene￿cial regulation that is de facto followed, when some
bureaucrats accept bribes to reduce regulation for individuals. Similarly, Bose
and Gangopadhyay (2009) analyze the e⁄ects of intermediaries on the amount
of undeserving applicants that obtain licenses. In these models, the interme-
diary has an informational advantage over individuals, in that he knows which
bureaucrats are willing to bend the rules (or accept undeserving individuals).
This provides a clear rationale for individuals to use intermediaries.
In models with intermediaries having such an informational advantage, in-
creased enforcement of corruption in the regular bureaucracy, higher penalties
6In our model, when we discuss the endogeneity of the length of the license procedure, red
tape serves no other purpose than to extract rents. Related to footnote 4, see Banerjee et al.
(2009) for a discussion of the function of red tape in models with deserving and undeserving
individuals.
7In "Asian drama", Myrdal (1968) not only hypothesizes about the speed of bureaucratic
service but also documents the existence of intermediaries.
5for individuals that bribe bureaucrats, as well as increased uncertainty as to
which are the corrupt bureaucrats, will typically act as an incentive to use in-
termediaries instead. Indeed, Hasker and Okten (2008) ￿nd that traditional
means of combating corruption are less e⁄ective, and can even be counterpro-
ductive, when there are intermediaries. Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009) ￿nd,
unsurprisingly, that the amount of undeserving applicants increases when there
are intermediaries. In addition, in their model with endogenous queue lengths
at counters, under certain conditions, not only undeserving but also deserving
individuals will ￿nd the service of an intermediary useful, in locating corrupt
(honest) bureaucrats.
Both papers provide a theoretical framework for the role of intermediaries
observed in the Indian drivers￿license context by Bertrand et al. (2008).8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts
about bureaucracy intermediaries. Section 3 sets out the model, in which we
￿rst study license allocation absent corruption, then add corruption and inter-
mediaries, after which we analyze incentives to create red tape. The main results
of the paper are stated in two propositions in this section. Section 4 contains
some model extensions/generalizations and section 5 concludes. All proofs are
in the appendix in section 6.
2 Stylized facts about bureaucracy intermedi-
aries
This section presents stylized facts about bureaucracy intermediaries in di⁄erent
parts of the world and provides a further rationale for the model to be presented.
Di⁄erent types of intermediaries assisting with bureaucratic contacts are
common throughout the developing world. Myrdal (1968) documents their ex-
istence in India and Oldenburg (1987) goes further with a more formal account
of the role of intermediaries in a land consolidation program in Uttar Pradesh.
Oldenburg identi￿es di⁄erent roles of intermediaries within and outside the bu-
reaucracy and details the functions of "brokers", "touts", "scribes", "consolida-
tors", "helpers" and "barkers" within the land consolidation program. Levine
(1975) documents the existence of intermediaries in the interface between the
Ghanaian bureaucracy and ￿rms and individuals.
8The present paper resembles these papers in that it contains the same three "actors", i.e.
individuals, bureaucrats and intermediaries, but the type of corruption and the rationale for
using the intermediary is di⁄erent. In addition, the role of di⁄erent degrees of competition
between intermediaries is formally analyzed and we discuss two di⁄erent forms of bureaucracy-
intermediary interaction.
6The prevalence of "despachantes", used in bureaucratic contacts in Brazil,
is documented by Rosenn (1971) and, from a sociological and anthropologi-
cal viewpoint, by DaMatta (1979, 1984). When studying the formalization of
￿rms, Stone et al. (1996), Zylbersztajn and Gra￿a (2003) and Zylbersztajn
et al. (2007) provide evidence that using "despachantes" is the most common
way to formalize a ￿rm in Brazil. Husted (1994) describes how "coyotes" help
individuals obtain drivers￿licenses in Mexico. Such "coyotes" are an example
of "tramitadores", a more general and widely used term for (mostly) informal
intermediaries present in most of (Spanish-speaking) Latin America, assisting in-
dividuals and ￿rms with bureaucratic procedures ("tramites"). ProØtica (2006)
documents, for Peru, the degree of individuals￿usage of "tramitadores" in di⁄er-
ent bureaucratic contacts. Lambsdor⁄ (2002) refers to "tramitadores" helping
out with the bureaucracy in El Salvador. Examples of reports documenting
the use of such intermediaries by ￿rms, at formalization are CIET (1998a, b)
and IFC (2007b) for Bolivia, CIEN (2001) for Guatemala, IFC (2008) for Hon-
duras and IFC (2007a) for Peru.9 Gancheva (1999) describes the use of similar
intermediaries by ￿rms in Bulgaria.
Although none of the papers above, with the possible exception of Oldenburg
(1987), is a speci￿c study of intermediaries, they point at the di⁄erent functions
performed. In some settings, the main reason why individuals use bureaucracy
intermediaries seems to be the intermediary￿ s knowledge of how bureaucratic
procedures actually work. In many countries with large and non-transparent
bureaucracies, actually ￿nding out what is required in order to get, say, a pass-
port, is a challenge in itself. Rosenn (1971) writes: "The despachante functions
e⁄ectively because he knows how to ￿ll out the bewildering variety of forms, to
whom the copies should be delivered, and what documentation will be required"
(p. 537). Honduran ￿rms claim that they use "tramitadores", when becoming
formal, because of lack of uni￿ed information from the authorities regarding
the formalization procedure (IFC, 2008). The same holds in a small sample of
microenterprises in Guatemala (CIEN, 2001). For Bulgarian ￿rms obtaining an
operations permit, "the procedures are not clear, nor are they easily accessible
to potential licenses applicants" (Gancheva, 1999, p. 22).
Time-saving in bureaucratic procedures is a related reason why individuals
and ￿rms use intermediaries. Data from the World Bank Enterprise surveys on
senior management time spent in dealing with requirements of government reg-
ulation con￿rm that the time spent with regulation varies a great deal between
di⁄erent parts of the world. Whereas the OECD average is 1.2% of a work week,
the world average is 7.5% and the Latin American/Caribbean average is 11.4%
(World Bank, 2009). A 1996 report studying only a few countries showed simi-
lar values for the Latin American countries (World Bank, 1996). The numbers
con￿rm earlier work by de Soto (1989).
9Another generic name, much in use in some parts of (Spanish-speaking) Latin America,
for the type of intermediary in mind, is "gestor".
7By frequent interactions, bureaucracy intermediaries learn how to handle
the procedures at the government o¢ ces and can solve the bureaucratic matters
faster than a particular individual or ￿rm. The processing of many applications
at the same time and having personal relations with bureaucrats are additional
reasons why these intermediaries possess a "superior technology". As a result,
the intermediary￿ s cost for acquiring licenses are lower.
Furthermore, Stone et al. (1996) and Zylbersztajn and Gra￿a (2003) indicate
that ￿rms use despachantes to become formal because these act much like "one
stop shops". The time-saving achieved by using intermediaries thus consists of
two parts: for intermediaries at the bureaucracy itself and for ￿rms by elimi-
nating the need to visit multiple o¢ ces. These two time-saving components are
made explicit in the model in this paper.10
3 The model
Section 3.1 presents a model with individuals, that get a bene￿t if they go
through a number of steps to acquire a government license, and a government
bureaucracy, that awards the license. In section 3.2, we introduce corruption
in the government bureaucracy, where bureaucrats accept bribes in order to let
individuals avoid a time cost involved in getting the license. In section 3.3,
intermediaries, allowing an alternative way to get the license, are introduced.
In these ￿rst three sections, the procedure for getting the license is exogenously
speci￿ed and we study what e⁄ect the introduction of corruption, and then in-
termediaries, has on license allocations and individuals￿net gain from licensing.
Building on these results, we endogenize the number of steps that the license
procedure consists of in section 3.4 and study bureaucrats optimal choice of the
number of steps (or red tape). We perform this analysis for the settings with
and without intermediaries, respectively, and study the e⁄ects on individuals￿
net gain from licensing.
The important assumptions made are pointed out along the way. Some of
the assumptions are then relaxed or changed in section 4, where the main results
of the paper are shown to hold also in alternative settings.
10From the supply side, one possible argument for the existence of bureaucracy intermedi-
aries is that the government allows them to exist as a means of helping individuals and ￿rms
going through bureaucratic procedures. Bureaucracy intermediaries then become a "second
best" option in societies where the government can do little to reform its bureaucracy. An-
other supply-side argument explaining their existence may be that intermediaries are easier
to work with for bureaucrats because they "always have their papers in order". That is, the
cost for handling applications from intermediaries is lower. Bureaucrats would then be able
to serve more customers of the bureaucracy in less time, which would be socially bene￿cial.
83.1 Getting a license - the regular way
Consider a government license that brings a bene￿t of the value g to any in-
dividual. Acquiring the license means going through a bureaucratic procedure
consisting of n di⁄erent steps. Each step of the procedure consists of one visit to
the government bureaucracy, where the individual interacts with a bureaucrat
who is a monopolist in this step. The individual pays the o¢ cial fee, and then
proceeds to the next step of the procedure.
The bureaucracy￿ s cost of completing the procedure for an individual, which
is also the o¢ cial fee for individuals, consists of two parts, C + np. The ￿rst
part, C, is the cost that the bureaucracy faces in undertaking the controls
associated with awarding the license, for instance checking relevant criminal and
tax records, etc. The second part, p per step, is the bureaucracy￿ s administrative
cost of handling each application at each o¢ ce.11 We need g ￿(C +np) ￿ 0 to
make the license procedure bene￿cial, which can be expressed as n ￿ nmax ￿
g￿C
p .
Individuals also face time costs in going to the bureaucracy. These time costs
are "standing in line", represented by k, and transport time, represented by t,
for each step. Individuals di⁄er in how much they value time ("productivity"),
parametrized as 0 ￿ Ai ￿ 1, such that the total time cost of getting the license
is Aink+Aint. Throughout the analysis, p, k and t will be positive and treated
as exogenous parameters.12
An individual will acquire the license if the following condition is ful￿lled:
g￿(C+np)￿Ai (nk + nt) > 0 () Ai <
g￿(C+np)
nt+nk . (1)
Individuals below the productivity threshold in (1) will thus acquire the li-
cense.13
11The division of costs into two parts re￿ects the fact the there are, for good reasons, socially
relevant checks or controls or registration (re￿ected by C) that need to be undertaken in order
to correctly award licenses, but the bureaucracy￿ s implementation of how to perform these
controls may di⁄er however (re￿ected by np). An individual starting a ￿rm, for example,
typically has to register it with the tax authorities and with employment records. In some
countries, this is done jointly in one place, in other countries this is done at two or several
more o¢ ces. We can think of p as the costs of handling each application at each o¢ ce,
such as remuneration costs of sta⁄, costs for o¢ ce space, o¢ ce equipment, o¢ ce supplies etc.
Although of no importance for the analysis, we can think of C as evenly split between all
steps of the license procedure, i.e. C=n per step.
12The speci￿cation of costs of the license as np + Aink + Aint, rather than p + Aik + Ait,
underlines that it is variations in n that will represent red tape below. This is di⁄erent from
e.g. Lui (1985) in which there is only one bureaucrat that chooses how fast to work (this
would a⁄ect k in the present model) and from Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009), where the
waiting times at the bureaucracy depend on the total number of applicants for licenses (this
would also a⁄ect k).
13Except for queueing and transport time costs, in real license procedures there are also
time costs related to waiting for the application to be approved and hence for the gain of
the license to be realized. Such time costs, and di⁄erences in such costs depending on what
channel is used to get the license, are not explicitly modeled in this paper.
9Before proceeding, we make an assumption - brie￿ y referred to in the in-
troduction - to which we will return in section 3.4. For good reasons, license
procedures consist of various complementary steps. Di⁄erent government au-
thorities, e.g. the police and the tax authorities, need to be involved in license
procedures such as getting an ID or starting a ￿rm. We assume, however, that
the license procedure, in a setting without any bureaucratic corruption, would
be such that all individuals can acquire the license. This is a plausible require-
ment for a government that desires to award the license in the ￿rst place - the
procedure should not be too complicated. Let the maximum length of such a




Condition (2) is not a parameter restriction in the paper, it is a condition we
assume a government interested in awarding licenses would adhere to. We return
to the assumption in section 3.4.
3.2 A corrupt bureaucracy
Now assume that bureaucrats are willing to accept a bribe b in order to let the
individual avoid the time cost of standing in one line (Aik). By bribing, the
individual can thus avoid a total queueing time cost of Aink.14 As stressed
in the introduction, bribing means paying "speed money", and the option of
instead waiting in line and pay the o¢ cial fee C + np still exists. Furthermore,
assume that bureaucrats, when taking bribes, can not price discriminate between
individuals with di⁄erent value of time. This is an important assumption in the
paper, used throughout the analysis.
In characterizing bureaucrats￿decisions on the bribe level b, the assumption
of centralized corruption will be used (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The corrupt
bureaucrats take one joint decision on bribe levels, and then split the revenue
equally between them. De￿ne this total bribe level as B ￿ nb.15
Having the option to pay speed money, the individual prefers to do so if the
following condition is satis￿ed:
14We thus assume that all bureaucrats are corrupt. In section 4.2, we discuss, in the context
of red tape, what changes if not all bureaucrats are corrupt.
15Note that we do not specify how many bureaucrats are responsible for the n exogenously
speci￿ed steps of the bureaucratic procedure. We can imagine both a license procedure where
the license applicant goes to n di⁄erent government o¢ ces/counters/desks and faces n di⁄erent
bureaucrats, or a procedure where the applicant goes "back and forth" to a smaller number
of o¢ ces/counters/desks with fewer than n bureaucrats in total (but still with n steps in
the procedure). Irrespective of the number of bureaucrats, we model all as corrupt, i.e. all
bureaucrats accept speed money. Another remark on the choice of model is that whether n
is continuous or discrete does not matter for results. It would matter only if we chose to
model corruption as decentralized, in the sense of Shleifer and Vishny (1993), which would be
di¢ cult to reconcile with our analysis of red tape in section 3.4.
10g￿B￿Aint > g￿(C +np)￿Ai (nk + nt) () Ai >
B￿(C+np)
nk . (3)
The LHS in the ￿rst inequality is the net gain of the license when bribing,
the RHS is net gain of going through the regular procedure.
Either all individuals with a value of time above the threshold in expression
3 bribe, or it will be too costly for the highest productivity individuals to face
the remaining time cost Aint. The individual would then prefer to not get the
license at all. In this case, the upper bribe threshold is given by the condition
g￿B￿Aint > 0 () Ai <
g￿B
nt . (4)
Intuitively, the larger is n, the larger are time costs and the more likely the
upper threshold from expression 4 is too bind.
The corrupt bureaucrats have a total cost of completing the license of C+np.
The joint pro￿t maximization problem of bureaucrats thus becomes:













From the intuition above regarding time costs for large values of n, and the
resulting change in threshold in the demand function, we can expect the solution
of the problem to be di⁄erent for di⁄erent regions of n. Solving the problem is
straightforward, the few steps of the solution are in appendix 6.1. We get16:
B￿ = (C + np)+
nk
2
if 0 ￿ n ￿ n1 (6A)
B￿ = g￿nt if n1 ￿ n ￿ n2 (6B)
B￿ = (C + np)+
g￿(C+np)
2(1+t=k) if n2 ￿ n ￿ nmax (6C)
The four panels of ￿gure 1 display the solution to the problem, as a func-
tion of n. The general properties of the solution, displayed in the graphs and
discussed below, do not depend on the parametrization of the problem.
Panel A shows the optimal bribe level B￿ as a function of n. Panel B shows,
for each value of n, the range of individuals that bribe (dark shaded area),
the range of individuals that get the license the regular way (below the shaded
area) and those that do not get the license at all (above the shaded area).
For small values of n (expression 6A), bureaucrats can increase the bribe level
linearly in n without losing any demand. Independent of the parametrization,
all individuals with productivity levels above Ai = 1=2 will bribe rather than
stand in line. The optimal bribe level, B￿ = (C + np) + nk
2 , with a mark-up
nk
2 over cost, shows that bureaucrats capture part of the surplus related to
individuals￿time saving through bribing. For future reference, note that the n-
range for which bureaucrats optimally choose a markup nk
2 over cost extends up
16n1 =
g ￿ C
p + t + k=2
, n2 =
g ￿ C






p+t+k=2, i.e. beyond the maximum value of n for which all individuals
would acquire a license, absent corruption (expression 2).
Figure 1. The solution to the license allocation problem with corruption:
optimal bribe, range of ￿rms that bribe, individuals￿aggregate net gain from
acquiring the license and bribe pro￿ts.
For somewhat larger values of n, the optimal bribe level decreases with n.
Thereby the corrupt bureaucrats induce a larger share of all individuals to bribe.
This is expression 6B and the intermediate n-range. For even larger values of n,
the fact that the time cost Aint is still present for ￿rms that bribe dominates,
and individuals with a high vale of time will not acquire the license at all.
Individuals with a low value of time, that would stand in line for smaller values
of n, now bribe in order to avoid Aink. The largest n for which any individual
would get the license, through the regular way or bribing, is nmax = (g ￿C)=p.
Individuals￿net gain from acquiring the license, aggregated for all individu-
als, is shown in panel C.17 In this panel, the aggregate net gain in the case of
17An important remark at this point is that we study how a rent-seeking/corrupt bureau-
cracy a⁄ects individuals and have therefore chosen to work with individuals￿net gain from
the license as the main outcome of interest. This would be equivalent to a welfare measure
if bribes and fees to intermediaries (in excess of C + np) were a social waste. If bribes and
fees to intermediaries were instead considered transfers without any welfare impact per se (i.e.
if we had no distributional concerns), the total value of time spent in queueing + transport
constitutes an alternative welfare measure.
12no corruption has been included as well (lower lying curve). The graph shows
a result that holds generally: individuals are better o⁄ when the possibility to
bribe exists. The following lemma states this point:
Lemma 1: For any combination of the exogenous parameters g, C, p, k, t and
n, no individual is worse o⁄ when the possibility to bribe exists, compared to
the case when there is only the regular bureaucracy, and some individuals are
better o⁄.
The lemma follows directly from the fact that individuals now have one more
choice of how to acquire the license, and the regular way of acquiring the license
still exists. No individual can thus be worse o⁄. All individuals that bribe - and
there will be some such individuals due to bureaucrats￿pro￿t maximization -
will be better o⁄than they were when the option to bribe did not exist. In fact,
the higher productivity an individual has, the larger is the gain from bribing
(because bureaucrats cannot price discriminate).18
Lemma 1 thus states that corruption is good: the possibility to pay "speed
money" means that (some) individuals can get the license at a lower total cost.19
It is a formalization of the "grease the wheels" view of corruption, see e.g.
Bardhan (1997) and Svensson (2005) for a discussion and early references.20
It is important to note at this stage that we have treated all parameters as
exogenous. If bureaucrats can control for instance k or n, i.e. if bureaucrats
can in some way manipulate queueing times at the bureaucracy - and thereby
extract a higher surplus from individuals, then lemma 1 no longer applies.
Related to the discussion in the preceding paragraph, Panel D shows total
bureaucracy bribe pro￿ts. It shows that total bribe pro￿ts are higher for higher
n, but only up until a certain point. For large n, the remaining time costs
Aint become too high, few individuals will acquire the license, and pro￿ts fall.
Pro￿ts are maximal in the intermediate n-range. We postpone a discussion
of bureaucrats controlling n - as well as further discussion of lemma 1 - until
intermediaries have been introduced.
18See appendix 6.2 for a formal statement of the di⁄erence in individuals￿aggregate net gain
from the license between the "regular bureaucracy case" from section 3.1 and the "corruption
case" from section 3.2.
19In addition, for n > n￿, more individuals will get the license than in the case with the
regular bureaucracy only (this comparison with the regular bureaucracy case is not shown in
￿gure 1B).
20In the paper by Lui (1985), individuals with higher value of time pay higher bribes and get
more favorable positions in the queue at the one bureaucrat, i.e. a form of welfare improving
"speed money".
133.3 A corrupt bureaucracy and intermediaries
We now add to the model the third alternative available to individuals to get
the license, intermediaries. Individuals pay intermediaries a fee, and obtain the
license. There are no time costs involved for the individual, and the time saving
obtained by this alternative constitutes a surplus from which bureaucrats and
intermediaries can pro￿t.21
As documented in section 2, intermediaries have access to a better technol-
ogy in acquiring the license from the government bureaucracy. We model this
as intermediaries having no cost, other than what bureaucrats charge, in ac-
quiring the license.22 We assume all intermediaries are identical. Importantly,
and as also assumed for the interaction between bureaucrats and individuals,
intermediaries cannot price discriminate between individuals and hence charge
the same fee to all individuals.
Bureaucrats charge intermediaries a pro￿t maximizing price for the license.
We continue to assume that bureaucrats take one centralized decision, and then
split the revenue between them.
Events proceed as follows. Bureaucrats choose two bribe levels, B = nb and
Bd = nbd, that individuals that bribe and intermediaries, respectively, will face
when acquiring the license. These levels are taken as given by individuals and
intermediaries. Second, all intermediaries simultaneously choose a license fee, d,
that individuals using intermediaries will pay (the license fee is equal between
intermediaries due to symmetry). Third, individuals choose if and through
which means to acquire the license.
We start with the assumption that there is perfect competition between in-
termediaries. This will be modi￿ed later, allowing both for oligopolistic compe-
tition between intermediaries as well as a brief discussion of collusion between
bureaucrats and a monopolist intermediary. Although modeling the interme-
diaries￿sector explicitly is one of the novelties of this paper, the alternative
speci￿cations explored do not a⁄ect the main results presented in this section,
and is therefore postponed.
With no other cost than what bureaucrats charge, and with perfect com-
petition between intermediaries, each intermediary simply sets a price d = Bd,
i.e. the total cost for the intermediary of acquiring the license from the corrupt
bureaucracy.
Individuals that go to an intermediary avoid time costs altogether, and get
a net gain from the license of g ￿ d = g ￿ Bd. Individuals therefore choose to
use the intermediary, rather than bribe, if the following condition is satis￿ed:







21Adding a small time cost for individuals at the intermediary would not change the quali-
tative results and is therefore omitted.
22Adding a small time cost for intermediaries at the bureaucracy would not change the
qualitative results and is therefore omitted.
14As before, individuals with productivity higher than
B￿(C+np)
nk bribe rather
than use the regular bureaucracy (expression 3). Corrupt bureaucrats choose
the two bribe levels, B and Bd, in order to maximize pro￿ts. Intuitively, as
individuals save more time from using the intermediary than from bribing, and
as there is no mark-up in the intermediaries￿sector, the joint surplus between
individuals and bureaucrats is larger when intermediaries are used. Formally,
the corrupt bureaucrats￿pro￿ts are the sum of "direct" and "indirect" bribe
pro￿ts. As before, the total cost of completing the license is C + np, and
bureaucrats solve the following problem:
Choose (B;Bd) to












subject to Bd ￿ g (8)
where the ￿rst term in ￿B is "direct" pro￿ts from individuals bribing to avoid
the queueing cost Aink and the second term is "indirect" pro￿ts coming from
individuals using intermediaries. The constraint comes from the fact that the
price of intermediaries, d, cannot become larger than g.
The solution, derived in appendix 6.3, is:
B￿ = (C + np) + nk
2 , B￿
d = B￿ + nt
2 , d￿ = B￿
d if 0 ￿ n ￿
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2 (9A)
B￿ = (C + np)+
g￿(C+np)
1+t=k , B￿
d = d￿ = g if
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2 ￿ n ￿
g￿C
p (9B)
The four panels of ￿gure 2 display the solution to the problem, as a function
of n, for the same parametrization as was used in ￿gure 1.23 Panel A shows
the optimal bribe levels B￿ and B￿
d (which is larger) as functions of n. Panel
B shows, for each value of n, the range of individuals that use intermediaries
(light shaded area) and the range of individuals that get the license the regular
way (below the shaded area).
The ￿rst thing to note about the solution, as hypothesized above, is that
no individual will bribe. The bureaucrats optimally set B￿ and B￿
d such that
individuals choose to use intermediaries rather than bribe.24 Although the focus
here is not on anti-corruption policies, it is interesting to note that all corruption
proceeds gets channeled through intermediaries. From panel B, we can also infer
that all individuals, irrespective of the value of n, will always get a license, this
is due to the removal of time costs and is di⁄erent from the corruption-only
case.
23As in the corruption only-problem, the general properties of the solution, displayed in the
graphs and discussed below, do not depend on the parametrization of the problem.
24By plugging in the optimal B and Bd into the threshold between the regular bureaucracy
and bribing,
B ￿ (C + np)
nk




, on the other hand, we see that in the optimum these thresholds are
equal, i.e. nobody bribes. This holds for both expressions 9A and 9B.
15For small values of n (expression 9A), the direct bribe is set as in the
corruption-only case. The indirect bribe, which is always larger than B￿ (panel
A), becomes B￿
d = (C + np)+ nk+nt
2 , i.e. has a mark-up of nk+nt
2 . This markup
is proportional to the time saving individuals get when going to the intermedi-
ary. Individuals with productivity above Ai = 1=2 will get the license through
intermediaries, individuals with lower Ai get it through the regular bureaucracy
(displayed in panel B). Similar to the corruption only case, note that the n-range
for which bureaucrats optimally choose an indirect bribe with a markup nk+nt
2
over cost extends up to n =
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2, i.e. beyond the maximum value of n for
which all individuals would acquire a license, absent corruption (expression 2).
For larger values of n, the optimal B￿
d becomes bounded by the fact that the
intermediary price d cannot exceed the gain of the license g. The optimal direct
bribe level B￿ is set higher than in the corruption-only case (expression 9B vs.
expression 6C), which makes direct bribing less attractive than in the corruption-
only case. All individuals with productivity higher than Ai =
g￿(C+np)
nk+nt , the
downward-sloping curve in panel B, get the license through intermediaries. Indi-
viduals with lower productivity get the license through the regular bureaucracy.
Figure 2. The solution to the license allocation problem with corruption and
intermediaries: optimal bribes, range of ￿rms that use intermediaries, individ-
uals￿aggregate net gain from acquiring the license and bribe pro￿ts.
16In panel C of ￿gure 2, the aggregate net gain of individuals from acquiring
the license in the model with intermediaries is shown. The regular bureaucracy
and corruption-only curves (from ￿gure 1) are displayed as well. The graph
displays a general result, formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: A) For any combination of the exogenous parameters g, C, p,
k, t and n, no individual is worse o⁄when the possibility to use the intermediary
exists, compared to the case when there is only the regular bureaucracy. For
small values of n, some individuals are better o⁄ and individuals￿aggregate net
gain of the license is thus higher with intermediaries. B) For small values of
n, individuals￿aggregate net gain is higher with intermediaries than with direct
corruption only, for large values of n the opposite holds.
Proposition 1A follows from a reasoning similar to the reasoning after lemma
1: given that individuals can always go to the regular bureaucracy, an additional
choice cannot make them worse o⁄. For small n, individuals that use intermedi-
aries get a share of the joint surplus related to time saving (which is proportional
to nk + nt). The presence of intermediaries and corruption thus "greases the
wheels", and individuals are better o⁄ than with the regular procedure only.
Proposition 1B follows, for small n, from the fact that individuals are better
o⁄ using intermediaries (to avoid Aink + Aint) than bribing (to avoid Aink):
the surplus to be divided between bureaucrats and individuals is larger. For
large n, bureaucrats set B high enough such that noone bribes directly, and set
Bd such that individuals pay d = g to intermediaries. Bureaucrats therefore
extract the entire surplus. In the direct corruption case, individuals pay a lower
bribe than their valuation of the license, and bureaucrats can not extract the
entire surplus.25
The main message from proposition 1 (and lemma 1) thus is that, for an
exogenously determined license procedure, the existence of "speed money" and
intermediaries makes individuals better o⁄.
Panel D reveals two important properties of corrupt bureaucrats￿pro￿ts.
First, pro￿ts are higher when there are intermediaries. The total surplus avail-
able from individuals￿time saving is larger when intermediaries can be used
to avoid not only the time cost of queueing but also the transport time cost.
Second, when there are intermediaries, bureaucrats pro￿ts peak at a larger n.
We now turn to a formal analysis of these statements, and their implications on
individuals￿gain from the license.
25See appendix 6.4 for a formal statement of the di⁄erence in individuals￿aggregate net
gain from the license, comparing the case with intermediaries with the previous two cases.
173.4 Incentives to create red tape
Thus far, we have considered the problem that bureaucrats face when maxi-
mizing revenue from "speed money", given a license procedure. That is, the
implementation of the license procedure, i.e. the exact number of checks and
controls, documents to be ￿lled in, stamps to be obtained etc., represented by
n, has been exogenously determined.
However, if the corrupt bureaucrats can a⁄ect the way in which the license
procedure is implemented, the analysis changes signi￿cantly. In actual license
procedures, it is not uncommon that the same bureaucrat has to be visited
several times, that application documents have to be certi￿ed/authenticated
several times, that the individual herself has to deliver and pick up papers at
an o¢ ce on di⁄erent days and times with varying opening hours, and so on
(Rosenn, 1971; de Soto, 1989). As motivated in the introduction, we take the
view that corrupt bureaucrats, while still obeying all rules and facing the cost
C - i.e. performing all relevant checks related to awarding the licenses, are free
to choose how the procedure is implemented. That is, bureaucrats choose the
number of steps n of the procedure. We de￿ne as red tape the di⁄erence between
the n that maximizes pro￿ts, and n￿ from section 3.1, i.e. the maximum license
procedure length for which all individuals would acquire the license, absent
corruption and intermediaries.
In choosing n, corrupt bureaucrats face the costs of making the procedure
longer, i.e. np. The pro￿t maximization problems (5) of section 3.2 and (8) of
section 3.3 do not change per se, the only di⁄erence is that n is now a choice
variable. We get
Corruption only:


























subject to Bd ￿ g. (10)
The problems are solved in appendix 6.5. The maximal pro￿t, as can be
guessed from the graphs above, pertains to the middle-n region (from 6B) in
the case without intermediaries, and in the large-n region (from 9B) in the case
with intermediaries. We are primarily interested in the optimal n for each of
the two problems. The main result is summarized in proposition 2, in which
we compare the solution of the model with intermediaries (n￿
i ) to the solution
when there is direct corruption only (n￿
c). In addition, we relate to the threshold
n￿ from section 3.1, i.e. the maximum length of the procedure for which all
individuals will acquire a license, absent corruption and intermediaries.
18Proposition 2: A) The pro￿ts of corrupt bureaucrats peak at a larger n when
there are intermediaries, i.e. n￿
i > n￿
c. B) The maximal pro￿ts of corrupt
bureaucrats are larger when there are intermediaries. C) Individuals￿net gain
from the license is lower when there are intermediaries (at n￿
i ) than with direct
corrupt only (at n￿
c), which is in turn lower than the net gain when there is only
the regular procedure of length n￿.







p(p+k+t). The latter is larger as long as t > 0. That is, we get more red
tape when there are intermediaries. The intuition behind this result is as follows:
In both cases, bureaucrats face increased costs np as n increases. In choosing
the optimal n, the marginal cost increase is compared to the marginal revenue
increase. With intermediaries, the increase in individuals￿transport time costs
from increases in n is a source of revenue not present in the direct corruption
case. For any n, the marginal revenue from increasing n will then be larger
when there are intermediaries, and thus the optimal n larger. The existence of
t also explains why maximal pro￿ts are higher in the case of intermediaries.26
What proposition 2A-2B tells us is that there is an additional incentive to
"add steps", i.e. create red tape, to the license procedure when there are inter-
mediaries. While panel D of our ￿gure 1 indicates a result similar to that of Lui
(1985)27, i.e. that bureaucrats maximize revenue by choosing an optimal num-
ber of steps (here) or an optimal speed of service (Lui), here we say something
more. We show that time-related costs that cannot be directly a⁄ected by the
bureaucrat will further strengthen, through the presence of intermediaries, the
incentive to complicate/slow down/add red tape. Bureaucrats ￿nd it optimal
to create more red tape when there are intermediaries.
Proposition 2C says that such additional red tape hurts individuals. In the
corruption only case, at n￿
c, all individuals get the license and are left with
some surplus. With intermediaries, at n￿
i , individuals using the service pay
exactly their valuation of the license, hence only individuals that use the regular
bureaucracy are left with some surplus. That the aggregate net gain is lower is
shown to be unambiguously true in appendix 6.5.
Proposition 2C says something more however: If there were no corruption
possibilities, and if the procedure was just as complex so that all individuals
could a⁄ord it (n￿, condition 2), individuals would still be better o⁄ than at
n￿
c in the direct corruption case.28 The addition of red tape to the procedure
thus more than o⁄sets the gain from paying speed money.29 Corruption hurts,
corruption and intermediaries hurts more.
26Again, see appendix 6.5 for a formal statement of pro￿t levels and a comparison of the
two cases.
27Figure 2, page 773 of Lui (1985).
28Hence also better o⁄ than at n￿
i in the model with intermediaries.
29This result, which also is formally proven in appendix 6.5, can be further explained as fol-
lows. Compare the smallest n, with and without corruption, in which the highest productivity
individual is just indi⁄erent between getting a license and not getting it. That is, compare a
194 Extensions
Above, we have assumed perfect competition between intermediaries, resulting
in no mark-up from the sector itself. Hasker and Okten (2008) motivate the
same assumption, reasoning that "since the market for intermediaries is infor-
mal, generally without government license or even recognition, and without high
￿xed costs, we assume that this market is competitive" (p 105). Whereas in
some countries and settings this seems the most plausible starting assumption, it
need not be the typical case. In general, there are some entry costs into learning
license procedures, getting to know the bureaucrats, setting up an o¢ ce, build-
ing a clientele, etc. In section 4.1, we study the implications on individuals￿net
gain and bureaucrats￿red tape incentives when there is imperfect competition
between intermediaries.
Another assumption from above is that all bureaucrats are corrupt. Al-
though we have ruled out extortion, it is perhaps unrealistic that all bureau-
crats accept "speed money". In section 4.2, we discuss what happens when not
all bureaucrats accept speed money. This adds additional insight with respect
to corrupt bureaucrats￿rent extraction possibilities. Finally, in section 4.3, we
brie￿ y speculate on an alternative setting of bureacrat-intermediary interaction,
collusion.
4.1 Oligopolistic competition between intermediaries
Assume the intermediation sector is characterized by Cournot competition. This
makes it possible to study the e⁄ects of a mark-up in a simple way. Assume
there are x intermediaries. The sequence of decisions between bureaucrats, in-
termediaries and individuals is as before, but we need to detail the choice of d
within the intermediary sector. As is standard in Cournot competition, each
intermediary simultaneously makes a quantity choice of how many licenses to
handle, taking the quantity choices of the x ￿ 1 other intermediaries as given.
This, in turn, results in a mark-up from the intermediary sector, over Bd, which
is a decreasing function of x. The formulation and solution to this problem is
briber￿ s net gain at n1 =
g ￿ C
p + t + k=2
with the net gain of an individual that, absent corrup-
tion, faces a license procedure of length n￿ =
g ￿ C
p + t + k
. To simplify, assume that t is very






. We know from above that the optimal
bribe in 6A is B￿ = (C + np)+ nk
2 . At n1, any briber￿ s net gain, g￿B￿￿Aint, after plugging
in n1 and simplifying, would be (almost) zero. Due to the removal of queueing time costs, the
bureaucrat can extract a larger surplus from each individual. In the regular bureaucracy case
at n￿, any individual Ai < 1 is left with a larger surplus. The intuition remains the same for
a positive t - the removal of some time costs allows the bureaucrat, when free to choose n, to
extract a larger part of each individuals￿surplus.
20straightforward - the main change being the introduction of an additional verti-
cal markup (or a vertical externality) that reduces demand for intermediaries.30
The solution is
B￿ = C + np + nk
2 , B￿
d = B￿ + nt
2 , d￿ = B￿
d + nt






















For small n, the price of intermediaries is higher than before. As a result, the
productivity threshold above which individuals use intermediaries shifts up and
the same individuals will instead bribe.31 As bureaucrats gain less corruption
pro￿ts from a briber than they would do if the individual would instead use an
intermediary, total bureaucracy pro￿ts go down for small n. This in turn makes
it pro￿table for bureaucrats to shift to B￿
d = g at a lower n than previously,
which explains the new n-threshold. Above the threshold, noone bribes. Note
that expressions 11A-11B converge to 9A-9B as x ! 1.
Although there is now a mark-up in the intermediary sector, proposition 1
still holds. It continues to be true that the additional choice of intermediaries
cannot make individuals worse o⁄, proposition 1A thus holds. For small sizes
of n, individuals still gain more from using intermediaries than from bribing,
hence proposition 1B also holds.32 As a result of higher prices at intermediaries
however, the aggregate net gain for individuals, is lower the lower is the degree
of competition between intermediaries. It is formally proven to hold in appendix
6.6 and summarized in corollary 1:
Corollary 1: Individuals are always (at least weakly) better o⁄ the larger is
the degree of competition between intermediaries (i.e. the larger is x).
This result is intuitive. It follows from the fact that intermediaries perform a
function that is bene￿cial for individuals (it removes time costs), and the more
competition between intermediaries the less individuals have to pay for the time
saving. In models where intermediaries have functions di⁄erent than here, such
as facilitating rule-breaking (Hasker and Okten, 2008; Bose and Gangopadhyay,
2009), competition between intermediaries is likely detrimental.
In addition, because the solution in 11B is identical to 9B, and knowing that
pro￿ts peak in this large-n region, endogenizing n gives the same result as in
proposition 2. That is, bureaucrats￿incentive to add red tape has not changed
from the introduction of intermediaries.
30See appendix 6.6 for a formal statement of the pro￿t maximization problems.




2, while the intermediary-bribe threshold becomes d￿￿B￿
nt = 2+x
2+2x = 3
4, such that individuals
between 1
2 ￿ Ai ￿ 3
4 now bribe, and individuals 3
4 ￿ Ai ￿ 1 use intermediaries.
32See appendix 6.6.
214.2 Some bureaucrats are honest
In the models above, we assumed that there is a constant number of bureaucrats,
all of which are corrupt. Consider ￿rst the model without intermediaries. The
corrupt bureaucrats accept speed money for letting individuals skip lines, and,
the more lines, the higher the revenue (up to n￿
c). Importantly, however, revenue
would not increase if the additional step of the procedure was associated with a
new honest bureaucrat that did not accept speed money. There would simply
be no additional source of rents.
Now think of the case with intermediaries. The same corrupt bureaucrats,
through intermediaries, accept speed money for letting individuals skip lines
and transport costs, and, the more lines and transports, the higher the revenue
(up to n￿
i ). Di⁄erently from above, revenue would increase if the additional
step of the procedure was associated with a new, honest bureaucrat. This is
due to the fact that the time costs associated with the counter can be avoided
by using an intermediary, and hence constitutes a source of surplus for corrupt
bureaucrats.33
With the addition of "honest steps", the incentives to create red tape thus
di⁄er somewhat between a setting with- and a setting without intermediaries.
With intermediaries, corrupt bureaucrats can gain additional revenue even if
such honest steps, at which individuals cannot bribe to skip lines, are added to
the procedure. For corrupt bureaucrats, any addition to the bureaucratic proce-
dure that adds transport time costs is a source of potential revenue, channeled
through intermediaries.
4.3 Collusion between bureaucrats and intermediaries
The upstream-downstream relationship between bureaucrats and intermediaries
explored so far is certainly not the only possible form of interaction between
these two actors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explicitly model al-
ternative arrangements and little is known empirically about the bureaucrat-
intermediary interaction (the study of Bertrand et al, 2008, being an exception).
An alternative to the model above however, with at least anecdotal support,
is to think of an intermediary as an entity with very close ties to the bureaucracy,
perhaps it is a government employee/bureaucrat that doubles in the intermedi-
ation market, or a former bureaucrat.34 Such arrangements indicate some form
of collusion in the bureaucrat-intermediary interaction.
33We have assumed that also honest bureaucrats handle applications from intermediaries.
We can think of the intermediary as paying C=n + p for completing an honest step. The
reasons outlined in section 2 for why the intermediary has a lower cost of acquiring the license
still apply when the bureaucrat is honest. Handling 20 applications at the same time and
knowing how the procedure works are two reasons why intermediaries have a lower cost also
when having to go through honest steps.
34See Fjeldstad (2003) for an account of how former employees of the bureaucracy in Tan-
zania, having lost their job on corruption charges, started working as intermediaries instead.
22In the model in section 4.1, a low x and hence a high mark-up from interme-
diaries perhaps arises from high entry costs to become an intermediary (think
of a license procedure that requires detailed expert knowledge). It can easily
be shown, for the range of n in expression 11A, that the sum of intermediaries￿
and bureaucrats￿pro￿ts decreases the less competition there is, with the lowest
pro￿ts when there is a monopolist intermediary. In such a setting, both the
nature of the entry requirements (a former bureaucrat is appropriate for the
intermediary job) and the fact that a joint price setting would eliminate the
double marginalization of section 4.1 and hence increase total pro￿ts, point in
the direction of collusion as an alternative modeling choice.
A joint price setting by bureaucrats and intermediaries (perhaps followed
by bargaining between the two over how to split pro￿ts) would replicate the
results of section 3, which is the set-up that maximizes the joint bureaucracy-
intermediary surplus.
5 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to study what impact bu-
reaucracy intermediaries have on the emergence of red tape. We show that
when corrupt bureaucrats are free to choose the level of red tape, there is more
red tape and individuals are unambiguously worse o⁄ in a setting with inter-
mediaries than when there is ￿direct￿corruption only. With bureaucracy inter-
mediaries common throughout most of the developing world, this constitutes a
potential explanation why license procedures tend to be very long and tedious
in many countries.
However, it should also be underlined that, given an amount of regulation,
bureaucracy intermediaries may constitute a "second best". In societies where
the government can do little to reform its bureaucracy, allowing intermediaries
may be a way to give citizens a better de facto access to the bureaucracy,
it "greases the wheels". This may explain why, in a country such as Brazil,
bureaucracy intermediaries ("despachantes") are typically neither illegal nor
informal, but instead legalized entities.
We also show in the paper that competition between intermediaries increases
individuals￿gain from licenses.
Beyond anecdotal evidence, there is little detailed knowledge about the
bureaucracy-intermediary relation. How the contractual relationships between
bureaucrats and intermediaries look, and under what conditions collusion comes
about, is an interesting question for future work. The same goes for empirical
work studying welfare impacts of the intermediary sector.
Similarly, Ankarcrona (2005) reports anecdotal evidence that Russian customs intermediaries
are typically former employees of the customs bureaucracy.
236 Appendix
6.1 Bureaucrats￿pro￿t maximization problem (corruption
only)






= 1. The problem in expression 5 becomes:






Taking the ￿rst order condition with respect to B and solving, we get B￿ =
(C + np) + nk
2
We need to check that
g￿B
￿
nt indeed is larger than 1, from which we get the
condition that n ￿ n1 ￿
g￿C
p+t+k=2. For larger values of n, high productivity
individuals would choose to not get the license, i.e. the upper threshold can
then not be "1", i.e. the solution is not valid.








nt . The problem in expression 5 becomes:







The solution is B￿ = (C + np) +
g￿(C+np)
2(1+t=k)
We need to check that
g￿B
￿
nt indeed is smaller than 1, from which we get the
condition that n ￿ n2 ￿
g￿C
p+t+k=(2+k=t). For smaller values of n, all individuals
would choose to get the license, i.e. the upper threshold can then not be
g￿B
nt ,
i.e. the solution is not valid.
We see that n2 is always larger than n1 (as long as k > 0). We must thus






The solution is B￿ = g ￿ nt
6.2 Proof of lemma 1
In the case of the regular bureaucracy (section 3.1), the aggregate net gain for











bur, the highest productivity-individual that goes through the regular




nk+nt . In the case of
24corruption (section 3.2), the aggregate net gain for all individuals, i.e. the net

















g ￿ B￿ ￿ Aint
￿
dAi,
where B￿ is given in expression 6 and where the limits in the integrals are derived
from plugging in B￿ in the thresholds in expressions 3 and 4 (as visualized
in ￿gure 1B). Ai
bur,c is the highest productivity-individual that goes through
the regular bureaucracy and Ai
bribe is the highest productivity-individual that




p+t+k=(2+k=t) and nmax =
g￿C








bribe = 1 if







nt if n2 ￿ n ￿ nmax.
The di⁄erence in aggregate net gain between the case when there is corruption
and when there is not, becomes
NGc ￿ NGb = 1
8nk if 0 ￿ n ￿ n￿





2n(k+t)2 if n￿ ￿ n ￿ n1
NGc ￿ NGb =
t(g￿(C+np)￿nk￿nt)
2
2nk(k+t) if n1 ￿ n ￿ n2
NGc ￿ NGb =
k(g￿(C+np))
2
8nt(k+t) if n2 ￿ n ￿ nmax
All di⁄erences are positive. This completes the proof.35
6.3 Bureaucrats￿pro￿t maximization problem (with in-
termediaries)
Case 1: Assume Bd ￿ g. The problem in expression 8 becomes:
Choose (B;Bd) to












The solution is B￿ = (C + np) + nk
2 , B￿
d = d￿ = (C + np) + nk+nt
2
We need to check that Bd indeed is smaller than g, from which we get the
condition that n ￿
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2. For larger values of n, the cost of using an
35In the second case we have integrated NGc only up to Ai
bur,c in order to simplify the
algebra. For individuals between Ai
bur,c and "1" there is a positive net gain in the case of
bribing and zero gain in the regular bureaucracy case (because these individuals do not get
the license at all). The expression given is thus smaller than the actual di⁄erence in net gain.
25intermediary would outweigh the bene￿ts, i.e. the solution would no longer
apply.36
Case 2: Assume Bd = g. The problem in expression 8 becomes:
Choose B to













The solution is B￿ = (C + np) +
g￿(C+np)
1+t=k , B￿
d = d￿ = g
This solution holds for n ￿
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2. As before, the largest number of steps
for which any licenses at all would be awarded is nmax =
g￿C
p .
6.4 Proof of proposition 1
In the case of intermediaries (section 3.3), the aggregate net gain for all individ-
uals, i.e. the net gain for the individuals that use the regular bureaucracy plus












bur, i (g ￿ d￿)dAi,
where d￿ is given in expression 9 and where Ai
bur,i becomes 1





nk+nt . The threshold Ai
bur,i is the highest productivity-individual
that goes through the regular bureaucracy. The upper threshold for using in-
termediaries is always "1" (as visualized in ￿gure 2B).37 Comparing NGi to the
case with the regular bureaucracy, we get
NGi ￿ NGb = 1
8 (nk + nt) if 0 ￿ n ￿
g￿C
p+k+t





p+k+t ￿ n ￿
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2
NGi ￿ NGb = 0 if
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2 ￿ n ￿ nmax
These expressions prove proposition 1A.38 For proposition 1B, we limit the proof
to the n-range below the lowest threshold, and above the highest threshold,
respectively. We get
36A property of the solution in case 1 is that bureaucrats set the same bribe B￿ as in the
"small-n" case without intermediaries (expression 6A). This is because individuals, as in the
case without intermediaries, can still choose to use the regular bureaucracy. The bureaucrats
therefore face the same pro￿t trade-o⁄ with respect to changes in B as in the case without
intermediaries. (The same property was pointed out by Hasker and Okten, 2008, studying
the e⁄ects of anti-corruption policies in a model with intermediaries).
37In writing these expressions we have used the fact that -in the optimum - noone bribes,
otherwise there would have been a third term in NGi (as there will be in section 4.1, when
we introduce a mark-up in the intermediary sector).
38In the intermediate-n range we have integrated NGi only up to Ai
bur,i in order to simplify
the algebra. The di⁄erence in net gain is thus larger than stated. For large n, i.e. for values of
n above
g￿C
p+(k+t)=2, individuals with productivity below Ai
bur,i =
g￿(C+np)
nk+nt acquire the license
26NGi ￿ NGc = 1
8nt if 0 ￿ n ￿
g￿C
p+k+t









￿ n ￿ nmax
These expressions, with the ￿rst di⁄erence being positive and the second nega-
tive, prove proposition 1B. The intuition is given in the main text.
6.5 Proof of proposition 2
Solving for the optimal n.
The order of di⁄erentiation when solving a multidimensional optimization prob-
lem does not matter. That is, we can solve for the bribe levels ￿rst (as in
appendices 6.1 and 6.3), then solve for the optimal n.
In the corruption only case, plugging in the optimal B for the small-n (large-
n) case of 6A (6C) give pro￿ts that are strictly increasing (decreasing) in n.
Given the continuity of the optimal bribe (and hence pro￿ts), we thus look for
the optimal n in the middle-n region. By plugging in B￿ = g ￿ nt in the pro￿t














c = g ￿ n￿
ct.
Similarly, with intermediaries, pro￿ts increase linearly in n for the small-n case
of expression 9A, and we look for optimal pro￿ts in the large-n region of expres-
sion 9B. By plugging in B￿ = C +np+
g￿(C+np)
1+t=k , B￿
d = g in the pro￿t function




















d;i = d￿ = g.




c with respect to t gives, after some algebraic steps to elimi-
nate the square roots and then simplifying the expressions, that the only so-
lution to this equation is t = 0. It then su¢ ces to show that, for some pos-
itive t, we have ￿￿
i > ￿￿
c. Take t = k as an example, this gives ￿￿
i ￿ ￿￿
c
from the regular bureaucracy, this is exactly the same threshold as in section 3.1, and these
individuals are thus equally well o⁄ between the two cases. For individuals with productivity
above
g￿(C+np)
nk+nt the net gain of the license is exactly zero (because d = g), which is the same
as in the regular bureaucracy case (when the same individuals did not get the license at all).

















, which is always positive
(due to concavity of the square root). This completes the proof that ￿￿
i ￿ ￿￿
c.
Proof that the aggregate net gain is lower when there are intermedi-
aries, compared to direct corruption only.
The direct way of comparison is to compare the expressions for net gain, similar
to appendices 6.2 and 6.4. We take a shortcut however. Knowing that n￿
i > n￿
c,
we know that going through the regular bureaucracy is more costly when there
are intermediaries. If we can show that the number of individuals that use
the regular bureaucracy is smaller when there are intermediaries, we have then
proven that the aggregate net gain is lower in the case of intermediaries.39
By plugging in n￿
c in Ai
bur,c from appendix 6.2, and n￿
i in Ai
bur,i from appendix
















These are also the fractions of individuals that use the regular bureaucracy in




bur,c as long as t > 0, we have thus shown that
the aggregate net gain is lower in the model with intermediaries.
Proof that the aggregate net gain is lower when there is direct cor-
ruption, at n￿
c, compared to the no-corruption case at n￿.
If we can prove that the net gain of individuals in the corruption-case is lower
at n = n1 than in the regular bureaucracy case at n￿, we·re done (because
n1 < n￿
c).




























The latter can be shown to always be smaller than the former (as long as k > 0).
39That is: fewer individuals use the regular bureaucracy and each such individual is worse
o⁄. Combined with the fact that individuals using intermediaries, for this region of n, have
zero net gain, the aggregate net gain in the case of intermediaries must then also be lower.
286.6 Oligopolistic competition between intermediaries
Pro￿t maximization problem of intermediaries and bureaucrats
The solution is obtained by backward induction, i.e. we ￿rst solve the problem
of intermediaries, then bureaucrats￿pro￿t maximization. In order to solve the
pro￿t maximization problem of intermediaries, we ￿rst need to ￿nd interme-
diaries￿inverse demand function. Knowing that the threshold for the choice
between bribing directly and using an intermediary, from (7), is d￿B
nt , we get
the total demand for intermediaries as Q ￿ 1￿ d￿B
nt . Rewriting Q = q+(x￿1)~ q
and solving for d we get the following inverse demand function
d(q) = B + nt(1 ￿ (q + (x ￿ 1) ~ q)).
Here, we have written one intermediary￿ s quantity as q, indicating that he will
take the quantity of all other intermediaries, (x￿1)~ q, as given. Facing costs for
the license of Bd, each intermediary chooses a quantity that maximizes pro￿ts:
Choose q to maximize q (d(q) ￿ Bd)
After taking the ￿rst-order condition with respect to q, applying symmetry
between all intermediaries (~ q = q), solving for q and plugging the optimal quan-




The response function captures the standard feature of Cournot competition,
that is, a mark-up over cost (Bd) that gradually declines as the number of
intermediaries, x, grows.
Bureaucrats solve the following problem:
Choose (B;Bd) to













subject to dresponse ￿ g
The only di⁄erence to (8) is that d = Bd has been replaced by dresponse. The
solution is given by expressions 11A and 11B. As pointed out in the main text,




4(1+x)), which is lower than the correspond-
ing threshold in 9A-9B, comes from bureaucrats￿comparison of pro￿ts for the
two di⁄erent solutions.
Proof of proposition 1 in the case of imperfect competition between
intermediaries
29In order to prove proposition 1, the method from appendix 6.4 is followed,












Proof of corollary 1








, in the model with imperfect competition, the
aggregate net gain of individuals from the license is the sum of three terms.
This corresponds to the individuals that use the bureaucracy, those that bribe,



























2+2x. The threshold Ai
bur,i is the highest productivity-
individual that goes through the regular bureaucracy and Ai
bribe,i is the highest
productivity-individual that bribes. The ￿rst integral is independent of x and
it can be shown that the sum of the second two integrals increases in x, i.e.
individuals are better o⁄ the more competition there is. Because the solution
in 9A-9B is a special case of 11A-11B, i.e. when x ! 1, we have shown that














, the aggregate net gain in the case with
perfect competition, NGi, is given in appendix 6.4. The aggregate net gain
with imperfect competition, where the bureaucrat charges B￿
d = d￿ = g and













After integration and simpli￿cation, we get NGi ￿ NGi,x = g ￿ C ￿ np ￿
3
8
(nk + nt) ￿
(g￿(C+np))
2









p we have the same solution in the two cases, i.e. the same
net gain. This completes the proof of corollary 1.
40NGi,x refers to the net gain in the model with intermediaries and imperfect competition.
NGi, from appendix 4, refers to the net gain in the model with perfect competition.
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